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Barnes: Establishment Clause

THE LEMON TEST AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
A PROPOSAL FOR
MODIFICATION
I. INTRODUCTION

The separation of church and state, as contemplated by the
First Amendment,1 has given rise to a troubling line of cases interpreting the Establishment Clause. 2 In 1971, the United States
Supreme Court fashioned a test for deciding these cases in
Lemon v. Kurtzman. s Previous Establishment Clause holdings·
were synthesized into a three-pronged analysis. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" (citation omitted):1 An act
which fails to satisfy any of the three prongs violates the Estab1. The First Amendment provides "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. These cases require a judicial assessment as to whether a particular legislation or
ruling advances religious doctrine or institutions, thereby "respecting an establishment
of religion."
There is an inherent tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. An act may pursue neutrality so aggressively under the former that free
excercise rights under the latter are compromised.
3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. The legislative purpose and primary effect prongs of the test were derived from
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). The government entanglement prong
was first enunciated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Lemon and its
authorities are fully discussed in.§ II, infra, notes 10-34.
5. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613. This is the first statement by the Court of these
three elements in a single, seemingly coherent test. The test's apparent simplicity makes
it immediately attractive as a practical judicial tool. It will be shown, however, that this
apparent practicality has proven illusory.
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lishment Clause. s
In practical application, this test has been the source of a
great deal of confusion,7 yielding what one writer has termed "a
conceptual disaster area."8 This comment will show that the first
or "purpose" prong is the source of much of the confusion. Accordingly, the purpose prong should be abandoned, as its limited
utility is greatly outweighed by the problems it creates. 9
It LEMON V. KURTZMAN

In Lemon, Rhode Island's Salary Supplement ActIO authorized a maximum fifteen percent salary supplement to teachers of
secular subjects in non public elementary schools. The lower
court found that approximately twenty-five percent of the
State's pupils attend~d non-public schools; ninety-five percent
of these schools were parochial Roman Catholic.ll As of the trial
date, all 250 teachers who had applied for benefits under the act
were employees of the Roman Catholic church. 12 The District
6. Edwards v. Aguillard 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987)(discussed fully in § III, infra,
notes 35-62).
7. See § VI, infra, notes 63-87. The confusion which the Lemon test has created in
the courts is persistent and receives recurring attention by the legal press. See, e.g., ReidiIlger, Trends in the Law: What is Establishment?, 75 A.B.A.J. 100 (1989); Reidinger,
Trends in the Law: Exercised About Religion, 75 A.B.A.J. 81 (Dec. 1989).
8. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75
Calif. L. Rev. 5,6 (1987). The author surveyed the Court's application of the Lemon test,
and found the distinctions necessary to reconcile the inconsistencies among the opinions
virtually imperceptible. Id. at 6,7.
9. The suggestion that the purpose prong of the Lemon test be eliminated is not
original. See Comment, The Lemon Test and Subjectiue Intent in Establishment
Clause Analysis: A Case for Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 Ky. L.J. 1061
(1988)(Abandoning the purpose prong would allow the Court to reach substantive questions and would "provide a more objective and consistent analysis for deciding establishment clause cases." Id. at 1075); See also Comment, Balanced Treatment of Creation
and Euolution: A Study in Reconciling the Two Religion Clauses, 34 Wayne L. Rev. 263
(1987)(Suggesting that inquiry into legislative intent is irrelevant in that it "adds nothing to the constitutional analysis since the concern of the establishment clause is
whether a statute in fact advances or inhibits religion, not merely whether it was intended to do so." Id. at 301).
10. RI. PEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-51-1. The law made no distinction between parochial
and non-parochial private schools, but merely provided the subsidy to any facility where
the per-pupil expenditure was less than the public school average.
11. Lemon 403 U.S. at 608.
12.Id.
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Court concluded that the Act created excessive government entanglement with religion. IS
A Pennsylvania statute,t' similar to the Rhode Island law,
was also analyzed by the Lemon court.lII Nonpublic schools were
reimbursed for expenditures on secular education, and were required to account separately for such expenses. 1S The statistics
were similar to those in Rhode Island: twenty percent of the
State's pupils attended non public schools, of which ninety-six
percent were religiously affiliated. 17
Before turning its focus to these statutes, the Supreme
Court fashioned its test, relying heavily on two earlier opinions,
Board of Education v. Allen18 and Walz v. Tax Commission. 19
In Allen, the Court was asked to examine a New York statute
which required local authorities to lend textbooks free of charge
to all students in grades seven through twelve, including those in
private schools. 20 The Court found nothing in the record revealing a legislative intent to advance or prohibit religion, and
the effects of the statute were consistent with its stated secular
purpose. 21 The "purpose and primary effect"22 focus in Allen be13. [d. at 609. The law required the Commissioner of Education to review the financial data submitted 'by schools whose teachers applied for the subsidy. The Commissioner would then determine if the expenditures fell below the public school average, and
if not, what percentage of the expenditures went to secular education. Because all of the
recipients to date were Roman Catholic teachers, this scrutiny amounted to excessive
governmental entanglement with religion.
14. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24 § 5601-5608 (Supp. 1971). The principle difference from
the Rhode Island statute is that under the Pennsylvania law, private schools were reimbursed for expenditures on secular subjects, whereas Rhode Island subsidized the salaries of teachers of secular subjects. In Pennsylvania a teacher's salary could be partially
subsidized proportional to the secular content of the curriculum; in Rhode Island any
religious content would render a teacher ineligible for the subsidy.
15. 403 U.S. at 609-611.
16. [d. at 610.
17. Of the religiously affiliated schools, the majority were Roman Catholic. [d.
18. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
19. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
20. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 701 (1967 Supp.) The statute authorized the loan of textbooks
for use in secular subjects only. The selection of these textbooks was subject to the approval of the public school authorities. No religious textbooks were loaned.
21. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243. Although the Allen court passed on purpose and effect
separately, purpose was given cursory treatment. The Court was willing to accept the
legislature's express purpose because it was consistent with the act's effect. Thus, the
Allen court paved the way for later decisions which would either accept a mere recital of
secular purpose or examine effect in order to assess purpose.
22. [d.
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came the purpose and primary effect prongs of the Lemon test. 23
In Walz, a realty owner sought an injunction preventing the
New York City Tax Commission from granting property tax exemptions for facilities used solely for religious purposes. 24 The.
state constitutional provision 211 allowing for the deduction was
found not to establish, sponsor or support religion. 26 The Court
called for close scrutiny of the degree of governmental involvement in religious activities and institutions. 27 The Walz court's
focus on governmental involvement was adopted in Lemon as
the "entanglement" prong. 28
After discussing Walz and Allen, the Court turned its attention to the statutes at issue by focusing on the entanglement
prong. 29 Rhode Island's authority to examine school records to
determine the amount of secular-related expense was held to be
"fraught with the sort of entanglement that the constitution forbids. "30 The similar power granted by the Pennsylvania statute
. was found to "create[] an intimate and continuing relationship
between church and state."31 Accordingly, both Acts were held
unconstitutional. 32
23. Lemon 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 243).
24. 397 U.S. at 666. Walz argued that the property tax exemption forced him to
indirectly support religious institutions in violation of the First Amendment. The opinion does not elaborate, but this support presumably came in the form of the religious
organizations' receipt of tax-funded municipal services.
25. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1.
26. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-74. The court found that the New York statute did not
favor any single faith, and furthered the state's interest in the "moral or mental improvement" of its citizens.
27. Id. at 674. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the court, recognized that some governmental involvement with religion is inevitable, i.e. taxation and exemption. The dividing line is crossed when this involvement becomes "excessive." Unfortunately, little
guidance is offered as to the parameters of excessiveness, which may account for some of
the resulting confusion when the term was incorporated into later decisions.
28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
29. Id. at 620.
30. Id. at 621. The Court, as it had in Allen, accepted the legislature's stated purpose on face value in the absence of evidence contradictory to that purpose. In Allen,
however, a secular purpose was found because nothing about its effects appeared nonsecular. Had the same reasoning been applied in Lemon, the opposite may have resulted:
Nearly all of the aid bestowed by both programs was received by Roman Catholic parochial schools. Had the Lemon court chosen to assess purpose through effect, both programs may have failed the purpose prong. However, the Court's discussion of effect in
Lemon was subsumed under the entanglement prong.
31. Id. at 622.
32. Id. at 625.
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On its face, the Lemon test represented the clearest statement thus far of Establishment Clause doctrine. 33 Chief Justice
Burger, however, offered a disclaimer to any notion that Establishment Clause "confusion" was ending: "Judicial caveats
against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation,
far from being a 'wall', is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship. "3.
III. EDWARDS V. AQUILLARD
The Court made fullest use to date of Lemon's purpose
prong in 1987 in Edwards v. Aguillard,3r. assessing the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute. 86 Edwards provides strong support for eliminating Lemon's purpose prong. Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science
Act"87 does not mandate the teaching of either creationism or
evolutionary theory.88 If one theory is taught, however, the other
must be given equal treatment in the curriculum. 89
33. Lemon represents the first attempt to synthesize earlier doctrine, but as will be
shown, infra, this synthesis misstates the basis of the doctrine.
34. [d. at 614.
35. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
36. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982).
37. [d.
38. [d. § 286.5 of the Act provides:
This Subpart does not require any instruction in the subject
of origins but simply permits instruction in both scientific
models (of evolution-science and creation-science) if public
schools choose'to teach either. This Subpart does not require
each individual textbook or library book to give balanced
treatment to the models of evolution-science and creation-science; it does not require any school books to be discarded.
This Subpart does not require each individual classroom lecture in a course to give such balanced treatment but simply
permits the lectures as a whole to give balanced treatment; it
permits some lectures to present evolution-science and other
lectures to present creation-science.
39. [d. § 286.4(A) "Authorization for balanced treatment":
Commencing with the 1982-1983 school year, public schools
within this state shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these
two models shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a
whole for each course, in library materials taken as a whole for
the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in
other educational programs in public schools, to the extent
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Plaintiffs were parents of school children, teachers, and religious leaders.· o All sought to enjoin implementation of the act as
a violation of the First Amendment.41 The District Court
granted summary judgment for plaintiffs.· 2
The court of appeals rejected defendants' argument that the
legislature's expressed secular purpose was controlling.· s Defendants' petition for rehearing was denied.··
Justice Brennan found the act unconstitutional on its face,4&
"[P]etitioners have identified no clear secular purpose for the
Louisiana Act.,,·e The stated "purpose" of promoting academic
that such lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin of
man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as
proven scientific fact.
40. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2576. Among the plaintiffs were the Louisiana Board of
Elementary and Secondary Eduacation, and the Orleans Parish School Board, originally
defendants, but later realigned in opposition to the Act. Id., note 1.
41. Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (La. 1985). Plaintiffs argued that no material issue of fact existed, and that the Act violated the Establishment Clause as a matter
of law. Id. at 427.
42. Id. The court rejected defendants' argument that a material issue existed over
the definition of "science":
We decline the invitation to judge that debate. Whatever "science" may be, "creation," as the term is used in the statute,
involves religion, and the teaching of "creation-science" and
"creationism," as contemplated by the statute, involves teaching "tailored to the principles" of a particular religious sect or
group of sects. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106, 89 S.
Ct. 266, 271, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). As it is ordinarily understood, the term "creation" means the bringing into existence
of mankind and of the universe and implies a divine creator.
Id. at 427-428.
.
43. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985). The court found that
the Act:
[a)lthough purporting to promote academic freedom, the Act
does not and cannot, in reality, serve that purpose... it requires, presumably upon risk of sanction or dismissal for failure to comply, the teaching of creation-science whenever
evolution is taught.... [T)he compulsion inherent in the Balanced Treatment Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the idea
of academic freedom as it is universally understood.
Id.
44. 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1985).
45. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2575.
46. Id. at 2578. (emphasis added). By this, the court obviously meant that petitioners were unable to show that the stated purpose of the Act is "clearly" genuine. The
stated purpose is clear: to promote academic freedom. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2
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freedom was inconsistent with the Act's primary effect of promoting a. particular religious belief.47 Provisions of the Act protected teachers who were "creation scientists" and provided research services to them, without making similar provisions for
those espousing evolutionary theory.48 This effectively gave "creation-science" curriculum a practical advantage. 49 The Court
then looked to the legislative history in order to probe beyond
the stated secular purpose:~o The belief that humankind was created by a supernatural being was found to be a central tenet of
those responsible for the bill.lil The legislative intent, therefore,
(West 1982). Unfortunately for the sponsors, a "paper trail" was left in the legislative
history which pointed to their religious motives. It is doubtful that such carelessness will
occur in the future. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
47. Edwards, 107 S.Ct. at 2582. The Court once again examined "purpose" through
"effect", an indirect way of getting at the true issue: purpose. If the effects of an act
indicate an unconstitutional purpose, then the effects are likely to be unconstitutional in
themselves.
48. § 286.4(C) protected teachers of creation-science:
No teacher in public elementary or secondary school or instructor in any state supported university in Louisiana, who
chooses to be a creation-scientist or to teach scientific data
which points to creationism shall, for that reason, be discriminated in any way by any school board, college board or
administrator.
No parallel safeguards were provided to teachers espousing evolution-science. Further, §
286.7(A) of the Act provided that "Each city and parish school board shall develop and
provide to each public classroom teacher in the system a curriculum guide on presentation of creation-science." Thus, the act required assistance and guidance in creationscience instruction while giving no aid to evolution-science. Finally, § 286.7(B) provided:
The governor shall designate seven creation-scientists who
shall provide resource services in the development of curriculum guides to any city or parish school board upon request.
Each such creation-scientist shall be designated from among
the full-time faculty members in any college and university in
Louisiana. These creation-scientists shall serve at the pleasure
of the governor and without compensation.
No such panel was mandated to develop evolutionary curriculum guides.
49. The Court agreed "with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act does not
serve to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting 'evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creation science... .''' Edwards, 107 S.Ct. at 2580.
50. [d. at 2581. The majority made a thorough examination of the debate and testimony surrounding passage of the bill. This represents the best possible method for truly
determining an acts "purpose" and yet, as the dissent points out, infra at notes 56-58,
this method is unreliable.
51. The Court noted:
The sponsor of the Creationism Act, Senator Keith, explained
during the legislative hearings that his disdain for the theory
of evolution resulted from the support that evolution supplied
to views contrary to his own religious beliefs. According to
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"was to restructure the science curriculum to conform to a particular religious viewpoint. "1i2
Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor, filed a concurring opinion also finding the legislative history had refuted the
Act's stated secular purpose. liS "The tenets of creation-science
parallel the Genesis story of creation, and this is a religious
belief. "1i4
Justice White concurred separately on the basis that the
lower court's interpretation should be given deference in the absence of any indication of error.1iIi
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
attacked the majority's application of the purpose prong of
Lemon, as well as the viability of the prong itself.1i6 Finding that
some indication of religious purpose is permissible, Scalia asserted "[t]he majority's invalidation of the Balanced Treatment
Act is defensible only if the record indicates that the Louisiana
Legislature had no secular purpose. "117
Senator Keith, the theory of evolution was consonant with the
'cardinal principle[s] of religious humanism, secular humanism, theological liberalism, aetheistism [sic].'
[d. at 2582.
52. [d.
53. The key witness testifying in support of the Act, Dr. Edward Bourdeaux, noted
that recognized creation-scientists were "affiliated with either or both the Institute for
Creation Research and the Creation Research Society." 107 S. Ct. at 2587. The Court
discovered that the former was founded "to address the 'urgent need for our nation to
return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His creation
and to whom all people must eventually give account.''' [d. Members of the Creation
Research Society had to "subscribe to the following statement of belief: 'The Bible is the
written word of God, and because it is inspired throughout, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically true.' " [d.
54. [d. at 2588.
. 55. Justice White found that "both courts construed the statutory words 'creation
science' to refer to a religious belief," and noted that the Court normally accepts a rational construction of a state statute by a court of appeals. [d. at 2590-91.
56. [d. at 2593.
57. [d. at 2594. [emphasis in original.] Justice Scalia's opinion further serves to illustrate the ineffectiveness of the purpose prong as an analytical device: "Our cases have
also confirmed that when the Lemon court referred to 'a secular... purpose,'it meant 'a
secular purpose'." [d. af2593. [emphasis in original.] This implies that secular purpose is
a lPinimum standard, one easily met. It is not a great leap, conceptually, from a secular
purpose to any secular purpose. By this reasoning, courts are invited to search the outer
reaches of possible legislative motives, and an act passed almost entirely for religious
purposes would still be constitutional if some hint of secular purpose were imaginable.
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The dissent concluded by calling into question the efficacy
of relying upon legislative histories which "are eminently manipulable. Legislative histories can be contrived and sanitized,
favorable media coverage orchestrated, and post enactment
recollections conveniently distorted. "118
Although it makes the fullest ll9 use of the purpose prong to
date, Edwards would have been more correctlyG° decided under
an effects analysis. s1 The Court's detailed investigation into legislative history could have been sidestepped by focussing first on
effects, a better choice given the pitfalls of determining legislative intent. The effect of Edwards on the Lemon test may be to
invite fuller use of the purpose prong. This is unfortunate, as the
purpose prong adds nothing to Establishment Clause analysis
and "is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results".s2
IV. THE PURPOSE PRONG'S SHAKY FOUNDATION
As noted by Justice Scalia, the purpose prong of Lemon has
received cursory treatment by the Court since its inception.ss
This highlights the prong's limited utility, and suggests that it
may indeed add little to Establishment Clause analysis. s4
The purpose prong is more apparent than real. SII This be58. [d. at 2606. According to the dissent, legislative histories, inadequate as they are,
are the only means available for the purpose. Beyond this, "discerning the subjective
motivation of' those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible
task." [d. at 2605. Justice Scalia would place purpose prong analysis in the realm of
guesswork.
59. Edwards represents the most detailed discussion and analysis by the Court of
Lemon's purpose prong, and demonstrates the lengths to which the Court can and will
go to ascertain the purpose behind an act. This repudiates the Court's prior practice of
summary treatment of purpose prong issues, noted in Justice Scalia's dissent, "typically
devoting no more than a sentence or two to the matter." [d. at 2593.
60. The result in Edwards may be correct, but it is best defended in light of what
the Balanced Treatment Act would have achieved: an academic environment favorable
to creationism while hostile to other theories.
61. The practical advantages and protections (discussed supra note 48) which the
Act gave to creationism had the effect of advancing this religious doctrine. No further
analysis is necessary to find a violation of the establishment clause.
62. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S" 38, 112 (1985)(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
63. Edwards 107 S. Ct. at 2593. See supra note 57.
64. [d. at 2605.
65. Purpose prong analysis is almost always, theoretically and practically, an indi-
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. comes clear upon examining the confusing authority upon which
it is based. In its first enunciation of the test,66 the Lemon Court
cites Board of Education v. Allen, supra, as authority for the
purpose and primary effect prongs. In Allen, secular purpose is
fpund to exist because, "[a]ppellants have shown us nothing
about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its
stated purpose."67 The secular purpose analysis in Allen focuses
almost exclusively on the effects of the act in question. 6s Thus,
the purpose prong was without a clearly defined criteria at its
inception.
Allen, in turn, relied upon Abington Township School District v. Schempp,6e the earliest express statement of an Establishment Clause test: "The test may be stated as follows: what
are the ,purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures
of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. II7O Abington involved two cases challenging statutorily
mandated Bible readings at the beginning of the school day in
Pennsylvanian and Maryland72 public schools. The Court summarily disposed of the acts' purposes by noting their effect: "But
even if [the state's] purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought
to be accomplished through readings, without comment, from
the Bible. "78 These readings are the effects of the statutes as
implemented, and not the purpose underlying their enactment.

The Abington test, supra, cited two earlier opinions, Everson v. Board of Education7 • and McGowan v. Maryland.'" Everson involved a New Jersey statute which provided for reimreet method of assessing an Act's primary effects.
66. 403 U.S. at 613.
67. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
68. Id. at 244.
69. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
'(0. Id. at 222.
71. 24 PA. STAT. § 15-1516 (Supp. 1960).
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77 § 202 (1957).
73. Abbington, 374 U.S. at 224.
74. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
75. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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bursement to parents for the costs of sending their children to
school on public transportation. 78 Some of these children attended Catholic parochial schools.77 The Court's focus was exclusively on effect: "The 'establishment of religion 'clause means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief in any religion. "78
There is no concern with the purpose behind any of these impermissible results. The Court examined the effect of the statute
and found that paying for busing properly furthered the educational program of New Jersey, and the incidental effect of aiding
parochial students did not violate the Establishment Clause. 79
Cited to support the "purpose and primary effect" test in Abington,80 Everson is actually only authority for the effect prong. In
reality, the purpose prong was spontaneously created in
Abington.
In McGowan, Maryland's Sunday Closing Laws81 were challenged. 82 The Court cited Everson for its "purpose and effect"
test;83 Everson and McGowan were later cited in Abington. 84
Recognizing the religious purpose behind the Act's antecedents,BII the Court held that the present effect of creating a uniform day of rest for Maryland's citizens rendered it permissible
under the Establishment Clause. 88
. Language in McGowan indicates a blurring between the
purpose and effect inquiries which was to recur in subsequent
debate. "[Elvidence of religious purpose . .. may be gleaned
from the face of the present statute and from its. operative
76. N.J. REV. STAT. § 18:14-8 (1941).
77. ElJerson, 330 U.S. at 3.
78. [d. at 15.
79. [d. at 17.
80. 374 U.S. at 222.
81. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 521 (1957).
82. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 422. Defendants had been indicted for selling a loose-leaf

binder, a can of floor wax, a stapler and staples and a toy submarine, on Sunday.
83. [d. at 443.
84. [d. at 443-45.
85. [d. at 446.
86. 366 U.S. at 449.
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effect."87

The opinions from which the Lemon test was derived focused their primary attention on the effects of challenged acts.
When purpose was discussed, it was given minimal treatment
and usually tested by analyzing an act's effects. Such problems
are characteristic of later applications of Lemon's purpose
prong. This may indicate that such difficulties are inherent to
this type of inquiry.
The purpose prong's ineffectiveness is further highlighted
by asking what evils it might realistically be expected to pre. vent. It is difficult to imagine a legislative body, possessing impermissibly religious motives, enacting a law with a patently religious preamble and no impermissible effect. As absurd as such
a scenario seems, it may be one of the few instances where the
purpose prong would have real utility.

V. THE RESULTING CONFUSION
Although it is generally included as an element of the test
whenever Lemon is cited, the purpose prong is rarely invoked to
dispose of an issue. A reading of forty88 state c~urt opinions cit87. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
88. Cortez v. Independence Co., 287 Ark. 279, 698 S.W.2d 291 (1985), Walker v.
Superior Ct., 47 Cal. 3d 112, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), Wollersheim v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 872, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1989), Okrand v. City of
Los Angeles, 207 Cal. App. 3d 566, 254 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1989), Jimmy Swaggert Ministries
v. Board of Equalization of State of Cal., 204 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 250 Cal. Rptr. 891
(1988), Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 545 (1988), Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 194 Cal. App. 3d
1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987), Bennett v. Livermore Unified School Dist., 193 Cal. App.
3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987), Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Philibosian,
157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1984), Conrad v. City and County of Denver,
656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982), Young Life v. Division of Employment and Training, 650 P.2d
515 (Colo. 1982), McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 191 Ga. App. 174, 381 S.E.2d
126 (1989), Koolau Baptist Church v. Department of Labor and Indus. Relations, 68
Haw. 410, 718 P.2d 267 (1986), Gregersen v. Blume, 113 Idaho 220, 743 P.2d 88 (1987),
Pre-School Owners Ass'n of Ill. v. Department of Children and Family Serv., 119 Ill. 2d
268, 518 N.E.2d 1018 (1988), In re Marriage of Tisckos, 161 Ill. App. 3d 302, 514 N.E.2d
523 (1987), Zucco v. Garrett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 146, 501 N.E.2d 373 (1986), Heckman v.
Cemeteries Ass'n of Greater Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 3d 451, 468 N.E.2d 1354 (1984), Terpstra v. State, 529 N.E.2d 839 (Ind. App. 1988), Farris v. Minit Mart Foods, Inc. No. 37,
684 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1984), Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass'n, Inc. v. Employment
Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 490 A.2d 701 (1985), Taunton Eastern Little League v. City of
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ing Lemon yields seventeen89 which separately discuss purpose.
Within this group, secular purpose analysis is unnecessary to.the
resolution of the Establishment Clause issues in question, and
produces confusing and inconsistent results. A few examples will
illustrate this.
A common problem in purpose prong analysis is resorting to
an examination of effects in order to test the constitutionality of
purpose. In Heckman v. Cemeteries Ass'n of Chicago,90 cemetery union members challenged a statute91 allowing certain burials on Sunday and legal holidays. A secular. purpose was found
Taunton, 389 Mass. 719, 452 N.E.2d 211 (1983), Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 426 Mich. 462, 396 N.W.2d 373 (1986), McLeod v. Providence Christian
School, 160 Mich. 333, 408 N.W. 146 (1987), Matter of Minneapolis Community Dev.
Agency, 439 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 1989), State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1988),
Pruey v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of N.M., 104 N.M. 10, 715 P.2d 458
(1986), Board of Educ. of MonroeWoodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Wieder, 132 A.D. 2d
409,522 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y.App.Div. 1987), Smith v. Community Bd. No.14, 128 Misc.2d
944,491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), Kay by Disselbrett v. David Douglas School
Dist. No. 40, 79 Or. App. 384, 719 P.2d 875 (1986), Salem College and Academy, Inc. v.
Employment Div., 61 Or. App. 616, 659 P.2d 415 (1983), Bishop Carroll High School v.
Commonwealth, Unemployment Bd. of Review, 557 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989),
Pennsylvania State Univ. v. Commonwealth, Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 95 Pa.
Commw. 388, 505 A.2d 1053 (1986), Covenant Community Church v. Lowe, 698 S.W.2d
339 (Tenn. 1985), State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.
1984), Bullock v. Texas Monthly, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), Witters v.
State Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989), State ex. reI.
Boyles v. Whatcom County Superior Court, 103 Wash. 2d 610, 694 P.2d 27 (1985), Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984), Bill of Rights
Legal Foundation v. Evergreen State College, 44 Wash. App. 690, 723 P.2d 483 (1986).
89. Cortez v. Independence Co., 287 Ark. 279, 698 S.W.2d 291 (1985) Walker v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. 3d 112, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified
School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1988), Bennett v. Livermore Unified School Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987), Feminist Women's
Health Center, Inc. v. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1984),
Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982), Young Life v. Division
of Employment and Training, 650 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1982), Pre-S.chool Owners Ass'n of Ill.
v. Department of Children and Family Serv., 119 Ill. 2d 268, 518 N.E.2d 1018 (1988),
Zucco v. Garrett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 146, 501 N.E.2d 373 (1986), Heckman v. Cemeteries
Ass'n of Greater Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 3d 451, 468 N.E.2d 1354 (1984), Taunton Eastern
Little League v. City of Taunton, 389 Mass. 719, 452 N.E.2d 211 (1983), Pruey v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of N.M., 104 N.M. 10, 715 P.2d 458 (1986), Smith v.
Community Bd. No.14, 128 Misc.2d 944, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), Kay by
Disselbrett v. David Douglas School Dist. No. 40, 79 Or. App. 384, 719 P.2d 875 (1986),
Covenant Community Church v. Lowe, 698 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1985), State v. Corpus
Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), Bullock v. Texas Monthly,
Inc., 731 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
90. 127 Ill. App. 3d 451, 468 N.E. 2d 1354 (1984).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 21 para. 101 (1983).
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by examining the act's effect: The Act in question has a valid
secular purpose. The record indicates that certain religious
groups were required to conduct burials on Sundays or holidays
because of their religious beliefs and could not always act in accordance with their beliefs because under certain labor agreements, cemetery workers did not have to perform interments on
those days. The act eliminated the discriminatory effect of the
agreements. 92 The act clearly had the secular effect of remedying
discriminatory work schedules,' but it does not follow that this
evidences a properly secular purpose behind the act.
In Bullock v. Texas Monthly98 a magazine publisher sought
to invalidate a provision of the Texas Tax Code94 which exempted religious publications from payment of sales tax. The
Court of Appeals found the act's secular purpose to be evidenced because it "restricts the fiscal relationship between
church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the
desired separation insulating each from the other." (emphasis
in original).911 The inquiry here is on the effect of the Tax Code
section, not on its purpose. It is not clear that a piece of fiscal
legislation such as this would be enacted in order to maintain
church-state separation.
Essentially, these cases reason that an act which has permissible effects must have been conceived for a permissible purpose. This overlooks the second prong of Lemon which expressly
examines effect.
Another problem courts have with Lemon's purpose analysis
stems from the lack of a clearly defined, judicially manageable
test for secular or religious purpose. This led one court to speculate as to governmental motives. In Pre-School Owners Ass'n v.
Department of Children and Family Services," the Illinois Su. preme Court examined a statutory provision 97 which exempted
religiously affiliated day-care centers from its licensing requirements. Applying Lemon's purpose prong the Court found that
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

468 N.E. 2d at 1358.
731 S.W. 2d 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd. 109 S.Ct. 890.
TEx. TAX CODE § 151.312 (Supp. 1987).
731 S.W. 2d at 163 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 676).
119 Ill. 2d 268, 518 N.E. 2d 1018 (1988).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23 par 2212.09(i)(1985).
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"[T]he legislature could have properly found that the need for
regulation by the department was more urgent in some areas
than in others and therefore could have determined to concentrate the Departments's resources on those programs where the
perceived need was greater. 98 Had the actual purpose behind the
act been impermissible under Lemon, this fact would nonetheless have been obscured by the court's willingness to supply a
permissible one. Such speculation obviates any attempt at
meaningful purpose prong inquiry.
Other courts have been equally creative in analyzing an
act's purpose. Smith v. Community Bd. No. 1499 involved a challenge to a community board's approval of the construction of an
eruv lOO around a portion of New York City. The Court, looking
for a secular purpose, went beyond the eruv's function as an aid
to observing the Jewish Sabbath. "The requirement of a secular
purpose has been satisfied inasmuch as the eruv committee
raised sea fences which had fallen into disrepair over the years.
These sea fences had originally been built to prevent flooding,
erosion and windblown sand from going onto the streets and
neighboring property. mOl Although a portion of the eruv in
question was the sea fence, it is unlikely that the eruv committee's reason for repairing it was for any purpose other than the
maintenance of a religious structure.
Perhaps the simplest way for courts to dispose of purpose
prong inquiry is to merely acknowledge a legislative statement of
properly secular purpose: "The secular purpose requirement has
become a largely perfunctory inquiry easily satisfied by any legislative recitation of purpose. . . .We need only look to the
quoted statement of purpose found in RCW 74.16.181 to hold
that this statute has a valid secular legislative purpose.IIl02
98. 119 Ill. 2d at 275, 518 N.E. 2d at 1024 (emphasis added).
99. ~91 N.Y.S. 2d 584, 128 Misc.2d 944 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
100. An eruv, under Jewish law, is an unbroken physical boundary of an area of land
owned by the public and open to the public 24 hours a day. It allows a Jewish person
observing the Sabbath to move objects from his private residence onto public property
and back. Such activities would ordinarily be prohibited during the Sabbath. [d. at 585.
101. [d. at 587.
102. Witters v. State Comm'n For the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d
624, 689 P.2d 53,56 (1984) rev'd 474 U.S. 481.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The line drawn between church and state will remain perennially flexible, given the inherent tension between the two religion clauses of the First Amendment. Because this line must be
continually redrawn, a workable judicial standard is essential to
developing a coherent Constitutional framework in this area.
The purpose prong of the Lemon test undermines this framework by importing an element of subjectivity into an especially
vulnerable area of the law. The result is a line of decisions which
offer little lasting guidance and are difficult to reconcile. Eliminating the purpose prong will allow the debate to focus on the
principle concerns of the Establishment Clause: Has government
excessively advanced, repelled or involved itself in religion?
Michael Barnes*
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